INTRODUCTION
The United States does not have a healthcare system. Rather, people in the U.S. live and die with a messy collection of ad hoc attempts to structure care according to particular financing schemes. The result has been disastrous: tens of millions of Americans cannot access health care because they do not have health insurance or the personal resources required for treatment without insurance.
1 Millions more hold insurance policies but are actually or effectively denied coverage because of complex or inadequate plans, steep co-pays, and refusals by their insurance companies to pay for prescribed treatments.
2 Overall, the poorest and sickest among us are denied care most frequently and carry the greatest financial burden, leading to the deep inequity that defines U.S. healthcare. do not violate the right. The duty to fulfill requires governments to take the steps necessary to ensure that the right may be fully realized by all persons. Part I(A) of this Article outlines the content of the right to health as it is defined by international human rights law. Although the focus of this piece is primarily on health care, human rights law recognizes the impossibility of separating the requirements for a successful healthcare system from the overall health needs of a population. The right to health therefore includes requirements regarding access to the underlying determinants of health, such as housing and education.
Part I(B) discusses the ways in which the United States may be legally obligated-under international law-to recognize and promote the right to health. Although the U.S. has not ratified the primary treaty that contains that right (the ICESCR), it is party to other treaties that are relevant to health, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") 14 and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ("ICERD"). 15 In addition, the U.S. has some limited legal obligations associated with its signature of the ICESCR. Beyond any legal obligation, the article also argues that moral, historical, and political interests support a rights-based approach to healthcare reform.
Part II, III, and IV evaluate whether the United States respects, protects, and fulfills the right to health, finding that it currently fails to meet international standards at each of these levels. This Article concludes that international human rights law provides an effective measuring tool for U.S. healthcare reform efforts because it ensures that the primary focus of any proposal will be to promote the highest attainable standard of health for everyone. 16 
I. APPLICABLE LAW PERTAINING TO THE HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTH
International law related to the human right to health appears in numerous treaties and declarations, beginning with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 ("UDHR") and including a variety of international and regional instruments. 17 Overall, the goal of the international right to health is to promote the highest attainable standard of health for everyone. 18 The United States has some legal obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill the right to health despite the fact it has only signed-not ratified-the ICESCR. These include an obligation under the ICCPR to respect, protect, and fulfill the right to health insofar as doing so is necessary to prevent the arbitrary deprivation of life. 19 The U.S. also has an obligation under the ICERD to respect the right to health in terms of prohibiting all forms of discrimination. 20 Finally, the U.S. has limited legal obligations associated with its signature of the ICESCR. 21 Regardless of any international legal obligations to uphold the right to health, it is also in the best political interest of the United States to evaluate its policies from a rights-based perspective. Since viewing health as a human right carries both moral and historical resonance, using a rights-based approach avoids deeply entrenched and politicized arguments regarding healthcare reform.
A. The right to health under international law
The legal basis for the international human right to health appears in both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which includes health as part of the broader right to an adequate standard of living, 22 and in the ICESCR, which elaborates on the right under article 12.
23 Article 12 provides: Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
Id.
23 ICESCR, supra note 12, art. 12.
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NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:359 of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. 2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for: (a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for the healthy development of the child; (b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene; (c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases; (d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness. 24 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("CESCR") has provided additional interpretation of article 12 in its General Comment 14, which is explored in more detail below. 25 Under international law, the human right to health is not the right to be healthy. Rather, it is the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health. 26 The focus on attainable health instead of actual health highlights the impossibility of guaranteeing good health in the face of genetic, habitual, and circumstantial variation. The difference is significant, since it allows for contextual variation depending on the characteristics of individuals and the resources of particular locations. 27 The right to health includes two tiers. The core minimum content is non-derogable and considered attainable in all instances. The core content is part of the more comprehensive right to health as it is defined under international law.
Core requirements
Like all human rights, the human right to health is rooted in the promotion of human dignity, and therefore should be interpreted in such a way as to best promote dignity. 28 To that end, there are minimum core obligations for the right to health that are 24 Id. 25 CESCR General Comment 14, supra note 12, para. 4. 26 ICESCR, supra note 12, art. 12(1). 27 Under Article 2(1) of the ICESCR, State Parties are permitted to achieve the full realization of the rights "progressively" and to the "maximum of its available resources." Id. at art. 2(1). This provision is limited in two ways: by the core requirements (see infra note 29) and by the principle of non-retrogression, under which State Parties may not undo achievements made towards realizing the right in question. CESCR General Comment 14, supra note 12, paras. 47-48. 28 considered attainable in all circumstances, and therefore not subject to the doctrine of progressive realization. 29 According to the CESCR, these core obligations include "at least" the following:
(a) To ensure the right of access to health facilities, goods and services on a non-discriminatory basis, especially for vulnerable or marginalized groups; (b) To ensure access to the minimum essential food which is nutritionally adequate and safe, to ensure freedom from hunger to everyone; (c) To ensure access to basic shelter, housing and sanitation, and an adequate supply of safe and potable water; (d) To provide essential drugs, as from time to time defined under the WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs; (e) To ensure equitable distribution of all health facilities, goods and services; (f) To adopt and implement a national public health strategy and plan of action, on the basis of epidemiological evidence, addressing the health concerns of the whole population; the strategy and plan of action shall be devised, and periodically reviewed, on the basis of a participatory and transparent process; they shall include methods, such as right to health indicators and benchmarks, by which progress can be closely monitored; the process by which the strategy and plan of action are devised, as well as their content, shall give particular attention to all vulnerable or marginalized groups. 30 Further, the Committee laid out "obligations of comparable priority" to the core obligations:
(a) To ensure reproductive, maternal (pre-natal as well as postnatal) and child health care; (b) To provide immunization against the major infectious diseases occurring in the community; (c) To take measures to prevent, treat and control epidemic and endemic diseases; (d) To provide education and access to information concerning the main health problems in the community, including methods of preventing and controlling them; (e) To provide appropriate training for health personnel, in- cluding education on health and human rights.
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As with the right to health overall, these minimum obligations include both procedural components (e.g. providing access to information) and substantive components (e.g. providing access to health facilities). The core content of the right to health is nonderogable, even when a State has such limited resources that it must implement other portions of the right to health progressively. 32 The United States already meets the core content of the right to health in many ways. For example, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC") is a federally-funded agency that promotes "health and quality of life by preventing and controlling disease, injury, and disability."
33 Among other activities, CDC programs provide immunizations and take measures to prevent, treat and control diseases. 34 However, other minimum obligations remain unmet, such as the obligation to provide "access to health facilities, goods and services on a non-discriminatory basis." The core requirements associated with the right to health constitute only a fraction of the overall duties associated with that right. The CESCR has elaborated on these obligations in the form of four substantive elements which require the provision of health care that is (1) available, (2) accessible (including physical and economic accessibility in addition to procedural requirements relevant to access), (3) ethically and culturally acceptable, and (4) of good quality. 36 These four elements work together to create a comprehensive approach to health: they are interdependent and frequently overlap in the context of particular places and communities. Each of the elements is explained in greater detail below.
Availability focuses on the number and type of services that exist in specific communities. Availability requires sufficient numbers 31 Id. at para. 44. 32 of personnel and facilities. 37 It also requires that the personnel and facilities are capable of addressing the health concerns of the community. 38 For example, if a city with high rates of heart disease has only one cardiologist, that city has a shortage of available medical personnel. Providing the city with additional anesthesiologists or podiatrists will not meet the problem of availability, since those additional anesthesiologists or podiatrists will not provide additional cardiac services.
In the United States, availability is a particular problem in rural areas, which frequently face shortages of medical services and of physicians. 39 However, from a rights-based perspective, it would not be enough simply to increase the number of available services and physicians. Instead, a rights-based approach would ask (1) whether the geographic distribution of additional services and physicians addresses the shortages of rural areas, and (2) whether the additional services and physicians meet the needs of those populations. For example, a rights-based policy might consult local communities in defining their health needs and then provide the appropriate incentives and services to ensure that those needs are met.
Availability overlaps to some extent with the requirement for accessibility, since physical distance may be one of the reasons that medical personnel and services are unavailable, particularly for rural populations. Physical accessibility requires that medical goods and services be literally accessible to the people they are meant to serve. However, physical accessibility includes multiple geographic 37 Id. at para. 12(a) ("Functioning public health and health-care facilities, goods and services, as well as programmes, have to be available in sufficient quantity within the State party."). 38 Id. at para. 12. The CESCR stresses that the elements of the right to health are interrelated. Therefore, availability also includes ensuring that provided services are culturally and ethically acceptable to the community and that individuals and groups have the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes that may affect their development. Id. at para. 12(c), 54. scales, from the miles between hospitals to the architecture of individual health facilities. In the United States, the smaller scales of physical accessibility are addressed by the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), which requires that medical facilities meet certain building standards to ensure that all persons are able to physically access those facilities. 40 The ADA also ensures physical access not only through the requirements for the buildings themselves, which are extensive, but also by providing that transportation services be "readily accessible to and usable by" persons with disabilities. 41 In this way, the United States meets some of the physical accessibility requirements associated with the human right to health.
The requirement for accessibility has multiple dimensions. In addition to physical accessibility, the human right to health requires health services to be economically accessible, or affordable.
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Affordability means more than simply ensuring that the cost of services is as low as possible. It also includes the principle of proportionality, so that poorer households should not be "disproportionately burdened with health expenses as compared to richer households." 43 This means that the absolute cost of medical services is less important than the percentage cost for households. For example, if a household earning $500,000 per year pays $5,000 in medical expenses, then a household earning $50,000 per year should only pay $500 in medical expenses. It is unequal to require wealthy and poor households to pay the same dollar amount for healthcare services.
In addition to physical and economic access, accessibility requires non-discrimination and access to information. 44 These two procedural components of access underscore the overlapping nature of procedural and substantive elements within the right to health. Under international law, non-discrimination includes both de facto and de jure discrimination on the basis of any of the prohibited grounds: race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, physical or mental disability, health status (including HIV/AIDS), sexual ori- 42 CESCR General Comment 14, supra note 12, para. 12(b). 43 Id. 44 Id.
entation and civil, political, social or other status. 45 The prohibition of discrimination under international law is discussed in more detail below. 46 Accessibility also includes equal access to information about health services. The CESCR has defined the right to information as "the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas concerning health issues." 47 This includes information about reproductive health and health services, and it includes a duty on behalf of the government to provide information in a language that can be understood by its recipients. The right to information can be particularly important for communities that are traditionally underserved and for those who suffer from disparate impacts, and it therefore overlaps with the requirement for nondiscrimination.
In addition to availability and accessibility, under international law, health care must also be acceptable and of high quality. The requirement for acceptability includes ethical standards, cultural sensitivity, and a gender perspective. 48 Often, acceptability can be improved by including affected populations in the formulation and implementation of health strategies. 49 Quality requires that medical goods and services are "scientifically and medically appropriate," which means that there must be "skilled medical personnel, scientifically approved and unexpired drugs and hospital equipment, safe and potable water, and adequate sanitation." 50 In many respects, the United States meets and surpasses these quality requirements. For example, medical facilities are typically sanitary, 45 Id. at para. 18. 46 See infra Part I(B)(ii). 47 CESCR General Comment 14, supra note 12, para. 12. 48 Id. ("All health facilities, goods and services must be respectful of medical ethics and culturally appropriate, i.e. respectful of the culture of individuals, minorities, peoples and communities, sensitive to gender and life-cycle requirements, as well as being designed to respect confidentiality and improve the health status of those concerned."). 49 Id. at para. 54. The formulation and implementation of national health strategies and plans of action should respect, inter alia, the principles of non-discrimination and people's participation. In particular, the right of individuals and groups to participate in decision-making processes, which may affect their development, must be an integral component of any policy, programme or strategy developed to discharge governmental obligations under article 12. Promoting health must involve effective community action in setting priorities, making decisions, planning, implementing and evaluating strategies to achieve better health. Effective provision of health services can only be assured if people's participation is secured by States. Id. 50 Id. at para. 12.
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NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:359 and equipped with scientifically approved, unexpired drugs, and safe water. In addition, advances in medical knowledge and technologies have resulted in increased quality for many. 51 Nonetheless, the U.S. system continues to be plagued by its inability to provide quality care consistently, leading to widespread concern regarding quality shortcomings.
52
Quality and acceptability are deeply intertwined. For example, there is a direct relationship between culturally acceptable care and quality of care, particularly for minority populations who are less likely to have medical providers from their own culture. 53 The relationship between acceptability and quality emerges in part because of the importance of effective communication between patients and their care providers: since effective provider-patient communication is a necessary precursor to patient satisfaction and adherence to prescribed treatment, failure to communicate effectively across cultural differences will result in poorer health outcomes. 54 In the United States, there is a significant gap between the percentage of minorities in the population as a whole and the percentage of minorities who are physicians, 55 which results in a problem of both acceptability and quality.
The four substantive elements discussed above are complemented by five procedural elements:
(1) Non-discrimination. Non-discrimination includes both intentional and non-intentional discrimination, and is discussed in more detail below. Together, African Americans, Hispanic Americans, and American Indians make up more than 25 percent of the U.S. population but only 9 percent of the nation's nurses, 6 percent of its physicians, and 5 percent of dentists. Similar disparities show up in the faculties of health professional schools. For example, minorities make up less than 10 percent of baccalaureate nursing faculties, 8.6 percent of dental school faculties, and only 4.2 percent of medical school faculties.
Id.
56 See infra Part I(B)(ii).
(2) Participation. The right to participation is particularly important in terms of the decision-making process for health policy and health care reform, in part because consulting affected populations makes it significantly more likely that the outcomes of policy discussions will address their needs and thus meet the standards set out by the right to health.
57
(3) Access to remedies. The right to health requires that states provide access to effective legal remedies for violations of the right to health.
58
(4) Provision of information. The right to information "includes the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas concerning health issues."
59
(5) Non-retrogression. Once a government recognizes the right to health, regression is generally impermissible.
60
The procedural elements of the right to health are deeply intertwined and interdependent with the substantive elements. For example, effective access to health services requires that potential patients understand which services are available to them and how to reach those services. They are more likely to have that information if they participate in the decision-making process regarding those services, and the services themselves will more likely meet their medical and cultural needs if their participation is sought. Similarly, if a state provides universal access to services but does not monitor the quality and ethical standards provided by those services, it will still fail to meet its obligations under the right to health.
In the United States, the current healthcare system meets many of the requirements set out by human rights law. For example, practicing physicians in the U.S. have long followed a code of ethics maintained by the American Medical Association, which is one of the requirements of acceptability. 61 62 Nonetheless, taken as a whole, U.S. health care reflects significant racial and income-based health disparities, widespread barriers to economic accessibility, and uneven quality of care. Worse, these problems are deepening with each passing year.
B. U.S. legal obligations to uphold the human right to health
The United States has signed, but not ratified, the primary treaty that explicitly includes the right to health, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. 63 Nevertheless, the U.S. is legally bound to uphold key portions of the right to health. It should be noted that the discussion below focuses on U.S. obligations according to international law. In other words, it is not a discussion about the extent to which the U.S. recognizes and enforces the right to health under domestic law, nor is it a discussion of the degree to which international obligations may be binding in federal or state courts. 64 Rather, the focus here is on how legal obligations stemming from public international law require the U.S. to promote the right to health. First, as a State party to the ICCPR, the United States is obligated to uphold the right to health insofar as doing so is necessary for preventing the arbitrary deprivation of life. Second, as a party to the ICERD, the U.S. must undertake to eliminate discrimination-including de facto discrimination-in the right to public health and medical care. Third, as a signatory to the ICESCR, the U.S. is obligated not to take actions that defeat the object and purpose of that treaty. 65 Congress went on to ratify the ICCPR in 1992, making the U.S. a State party legally bound by the Covenant's terms. 66 Included in those terms is the right to life under article 6, which reads: "Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life." 67 Like the right to health, the right to life is not the right to be alive, but rather a set of governmental obligations to take the steps necessary to prevent the arbitrary loss of life within its jurisdiction. The obligations associated with the right to life are some of the strongest under international law: they are non-derogable even in times of public emergency, and according to the Human Rights Committee, they should be interpreted broadly at all times. 68 States must ensure that their residents are not arbitrarily deprived of life for any reason. The causal factors behind deprivation of life are widely varied: they may be attributable to individual action (as in criminal activity), to State action (as in actions by security forces), or to natural disasters, just to name a few examples. The right to life enunciated in article 6 of the Covenant has been dealt with in all State reports. It is the supreme right from which no derogation is permitted even in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation (art. 4). However, the Committee has noted that quite often the information given concerning article 6 was limited to only one or other aspect of this right. It is a right which should not be interpreted narrowly. Id.
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When a State has control over causal factors-such as when the deprivation of life comes from the State's own security forces-that State has an obligation to respect the right to life by preventing actions that would result in arbitrary deprivation of life. 69 Although a State may deprive persons of life through exercise of the death penalty, such deprivation must be for non-arbitrary reasons and according to guidelines established under international and domestic law. 70 Even when a State is not directly responsible for the factors threatening a life, it still must take all possible measures to protect against loss of that life. For example, in the case of epidemics and infant mortality, a State must take all possible measures to protect against the arbitrary deprivation of life.
71 Similarly, if a natural disaster threatens the lives of residents in a particular area, the State has an obligation to do everything possible to protect the lives of residents living in that region. 72 The United States has interpreted the requirement to protect the right to life broadly in accordance with its obligations under the ICCPR, both in terms of the breadth of protection and in terms of state obligations in response to threats. This broad reading is illustrated in its 2005 report to the Human Rights Committee. 73 In that report, the U.S. cited widely varying causal factors that triggered the State's obligation to protect life, including protection of life for the terminally ill 74 and victims of crime. 75 In addition, the U.S. included the Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004 as evidence that it was fulfilling its obligations under article 6.
76 By citing a law that protects the right to life of unborn fetuses, the U.S. has made it clear that it interprets its obligations under article 6 69 HRC General Comment 6, supra note 68, para. 3. 70 broadly. 77 In addition, the United States has interpreted the corresponding duties of the right to life broadly, citing both negative measures (such as prohibiting application of the death penalty to persons who were under the age of 18 at the time their crime was committed) and positive measures (such as compensation and other measures of assistance to victims) in its description of how it fulfills its obligations under article 6.
78
Now that we have established that the U.S. obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill the right to life under ICCPR article 6 entail certain obligations with respect to the right to health, we must determine the extent of those obligations. The right to life requires a country to protect against the arbitrary deprivation of life from both direct and indirect threats. Some violations of the right to health-such as tortious misconduct or denial of benefits for cancer patients-constitute direct threats to life. Other violations-such as not having access to health insurance-may constitute indirect threats. 79 Whether threats are direct or indirect, they fall under the obligation to respect the right to life when they are a product of state policies and laws. This includes, for example, a state's failure to prohibit de facto discrimination. As the Human Rights Committee has noted, it is an article 6 problem when ethnic minorities are disproportionately affected by threats to life. 80 Since minorities are more likely to die because of threats to their right to health, the failure of the U.S. to prohibit de facto discrimination in terms of access to the underlying determinants of health and health care violates its ICCPR obligation to respect the right to life. 81 The obligations to protect and fulfill the right to life are similarly applicable to the right to health. For the right to life, there is an obligation to protect even from indirect threats. For example, the Human Rights Committee has commented that states should "take all possible measures to reduce infant mortality and to increase life expectancy." 82 These indicators are closely tied to the overall ability of a healthcare system to promote the highest attain- 77 The U.S. position on this issue raises the possibility of an estoppel argument for any who would seek to apply a narrower interpretation of ICCPR article 6. 78 able standard of health for everyone. Therefore, taking "all possible measures" to address these threats should include ensuring that the state's approach to healthcare delivery does not create barriers to accessing care or threaten the availability, acceptability, or quality of health goods and services. The United States interprets its ICCPR article 6 obligations broadly in accordance with the recommendations of the Human Rights Committee. Therefore, to prevent the arbitrary deprivation of life due to inadequate availability, accessibility, acceptability, and quality of health goods and services, the United States should respect, protect, and fulfill the human right to health. By including the right to health in its right to life obligations, the U.S. would be taking measures to prevent the arbitrary deprivation of life by promoting the highest attainable standard of health for everyone.
2. The obligation to respect the right to health as part of the prohibition against discrimination under the ICERD In addition to its obligations under the ICCPR, the U.S. is also bound by the terms of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ("ICERD"), which it ratified on October 21, 1994.
83 ICERD prohibits racial discrimination in all its forms, which it defines as: any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life. [T]he term "discrimination" as used in the Covenant should be understood to imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, relig-Parties to "take effective measures to review governmental, national and local policies, and to amend, rescind or nullify any laws and regulations which have the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination wherever it exists." 86 The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination ("CERD") emphasized the fact that the Convention prohibits de facto discrimination in its General Recommendation XIV.
87
In 2001, CERD explicitly called on the United States to "undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms, including practices and legislation that may not be discriminatory in purpose, but in effect." 88 The prohibition against de jure and de facto discrimination under ICERD applies specifically to the right to health. Article 5(e)(iv) of the Convention calls on State Parties to prohibit discrimination in all its forms for the right to "public health" and "medical care."
89 Therefore, the United States is legally obligated under that treaty to address de jure and de facto discrimination that affects access to healthcare services. CERD noted this obligation when it reviewed U.S. practice in 2001, stating, "[T]he Committee is concerned about persistent disparities in the enjoyment of, in particular, the right to adequate housing, equal opportunities for education and employment, and access to public and private health care." 90 ion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms.
Id.
86 ICERD, supra note 15, art. 2, para. 1(c) (emphasis added). 87 CERD General Recommendation XIV, supra note 85, para. 1. Non-discrimination, together with equality before the law and equal protection of the law without any discrimination, constitutes a basic principle in the protection of human rights. The Committee wishes to draw the attention of States parties to certain features of the definition of racial discrimination in article 1, paragraph 1, of the ICERD. It is of the opinion that the words "based on" do not bear any meaning different from "on the grounds of" [race] in preambular paragraph 7. A distinction is contrary to the Convention if it has either the purpose or the effect of impairing particular rights and freedoms [.] This is confirmed by the obligation placed upon States parties by article 2, paragraph 1 (c), to nullify any law or practice which has the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination. The United States is legally obligated to prohibit and address de facto discrimination in terms of public health and medical care. However, this obligation may also be characterized as the duty to respect the right to health, since a state violates the duty to respect the right to health when access to health goods, services, or facilities is denied due to de jure or de facto discrimination.
91 Under international law, therefore, the U.S. is legally obligated to respect the right to health in terms of the prohibition against discrimination.
3. The obligation to refrain from violating the right to health insofar as doing so would defeat the object and purpose of the ICESCR
The third international legal obligation to uphold the right to health comes from the U.S. signing of the ICESCR. Contemporary law on treaty interpretation holds that signing a treaty is insufficient to show the necessary consent to be bound by that treaty. 92 Instead, ratification or accession is the typical way in which states demonstrate their consent to be bound, while a signature merely indicates the intention of the state to subsequently ratify. Thus, the U.S. signature on the ICESCR does not legally bind the U.S. to that treaty's terms. Nonetheless, unless and until the U.S. makes it clear that it has no intention of ratifying the ICESCR, its signature entails a lesser obligation to refrain from actions that defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. 93 This lesser obligation associated with signing a treaty is contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which the United States has long recog- 91 See CESCR General Comment 14, supra note 12, para. 50. 92 A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when: (a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty. Id. One could argue that because the U.S. signature on the ICESCR was several decades ago, the mere passage of time is enough to demonstrate that there is no intention of ratifying the treaty. However, that argument does not account for the fact that the U.S. has previously taken several decades to ratify treaties such as the Genocide Convention, which it signed in 1948 but did not ratify until 1988. This argument is further undermined by the fact that the U. 
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nized as binding customary international law. 94 Therefore, the fact the U.S. has signed the ICESCR means there is a minimum requirement to respect the right to health insofar as failing to do so would defeat the object and purpose of the ICESCR. 95 The meaning of "object and purpose" is not defined under the Vienna Convention, which has led to differing interpretations regarding the breadth of the article 18 obligation. Some scholars interpret the provision broadly to mean it applies to the core content of human rights such as those found in the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 96 However, it is unlikely that such a broad interpretation applies to the ICESCR; although the CESCR has stated that the Covenant would be largely deprived of its reason for being if it did not include a core content for each of the rights contained within it, the reasoning behind this claim is that the Covenant must provide clear guidelines for State Parties, not that the core content is itself the object and purpose of the treaty. 97 Furthermore, given the drafting history of article 18, it is likely the signature obligation is somewhat narrower than a prohibition on any violation of a general treaty objective. 98 In his article on the signature obligation 94 The United States has signed, but not ratified, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. However, the U.S. recognizes that the Convention is "generally rec- (1966) . 95 This obligation may be relevant in "assessing US trade and aid policies to the extent that these have health impacts." Yamin, supra note 62, at 1158. 96 97 CESCR General Comment 3, supra note 29, para. 10. Although one could argue that when States do not respect the core content, they cannot be moving towards the overarching goal of promoting the rights contained in the treaty, this interpretation has not been supported by Committee commentary or jurisprudence. See also Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) at 27 (S.Afr.) (discussing the issue of whether minimum core content is equivalent to a self-standing right under the South African Constitution). "[T]he socio-economic rights of the Constitution should not be construed as entitling everyone to demand that the minimum core be provided to them. Minimum core was thus treated as possibly being relevant to reasonableness under section 26(2), and not as a self-standing right conferred on everyone under section 26(1)." Id.
98 Bradley, supra note 92, at 308.
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NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:359 and U.S. domestic policies, Curtis Bradley argues that the obligation "is best construed as precluding only actions that would substantially undermine the ability of the parties to comply with, or benefit from, the treaty after ratification." 99 This narrower interpretation of the article 18 signature obligation is more likely to apply to the ICESCR given the CESCR's comments regarding the object of the treaty.
100
In some respects, a narrow interpretation of article 18 obligations means that the United States would not have obligations to uphold the right to health because of its ICESCR signature. Indeed, Bradley concludes that the narrower interpretation of the article 18 obligation means that the obligation is not relevant to human rights treaties at all, since "pre-ratification conduct inconsistent with the treaty is not likely to undo the bargain reflected in the treaty." 101 However, that claim fails to take into account different types of human rights violations. Although it may be true that some human rights violations-such as torture, or arbitrary application of the death penalty, for example-may cease immediately upon ratification, others involve long-term structural violations that can prove extremely difficult-if not impossible-to undo upon ratification. In the United States, for example, extensive reliance on private sector pharmaceutical companies for research and development of new drugs may substantially undermine the future ability of the U.S. to meet obligations associated with the human right to health.
102
Although it is unclear exactly what the Vienna Convention article 18 obligation includes, even a narrow interpretation of that obligation means the U.S. should not introduce long-term, structural reforms that violate the right to health. 103 Indeed, the U.S. should instead uphold one of the core content requirements of the right to health, which is to develop its system from a rights-based perspective. 104 To do otherwise would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the United States to comply with the ICESCR after ratification. 99 Id. 100 CESCR General Comment 3, supra note 29, para. 10. 101 Bradley, supra note 92, at 308. 102 See infra Part IV. 103 This does not mean that structural violations are the only violations that may arise because of article 18 obligations in relation to the ICESCR. For example, the obligation may also be relevant in terms of U.S. policies relating to trade or aid, when those policies impact health. Yamin, supra note 62, at 1158.
104 CESCR General Comment 14, supra note 12, para. 43(f). See supra Part I(A)(i).
C. Political benefits to using the international right to health to reform the U.S. healthcare system
Beyond any legal obligations of the United States to uphold the human right to health, there are political benefits to using international law to shape the healthcare reform process in this country. Given the history of failed healthcare reform in the U.S. and the ongoing debates focused on the same failed structure already in place, it is strategically beneficial to approach health and health care with a new perspective, and specifically one that refocuses the discussion on health above all else.
Viewing health as an inalienable right is not new in the United States. In 1944, President Roosevelt argued that every American has the right to "adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health." 105 The right to health was subsequently included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 106 which was drafted under Eleanor Roosevelt's guidance. 107 More recently, some cities and states have started recognizing the right to health, at least in terms of health care. In 2005, citizens in the City of Seattle passed an advisory ballot measure stating, "Every person in the United States should have the right to health care of equal high quality. The Congress should immediately enact legislation to implement this right." 108 Two years later, the neighboring city of Tacoma passed a similar measure expressing citizen and city council support for "state and federal legislation that would recognize the right of access and availability to high-quality, appropriate health care for all."
109 North Carolina and Minnesota have introduced constitutional amendments regarding the right to health, and Wisconsin has a new public insurance plan that will cover children in the state by 2008, which recognizes that "every Wisconsin resident has the right to health care." long history that continues to reemerge throughout the country as a morally appropriate way to frame healthcare discussions. In addition to carrying moral and historical resonance, viewing health as a right also circumvents deeply entrenched positions regarding the organization and financing of healthcare delivery. For example, one of the enduring legacies of the Cold War is a widespread suspicion of anything labeled-reasonably or not-as "socialized," including "socialized medicine." 111 The fear that the United States might descend into totalitarianism if the government guaranteed access to health care for even part of its population has incongruently outlasted implementation of programs designed to do just that.
112 Current debates over healthcare reform continue to fall into the same deeply grooved contours surrounding the role of government versus market. 113 However, a rights-based approach does an end-run around debates over the appropriate scope of government in provision of health services. Instead of dictating a particular relationship between the government and market, a rightsbased perspective instead focuses on the level of health available to the population. In other words, the degree of public or private involvement in healthcare delivery, goods, and services is only relevant to the extent that it undermines or promotes the overall health of the population. Taking a rights-based approach therefore forces healthcare debates to focus on the health of a population, rather than allowing the discussion to stagnate over philosophical and political differences on the role of government.
The political benefits to approaching healthcare reform from a rights-based perspective underscore the need to find a new way to evaluate reform proposals. The next sections evaluate the current U.S. healthcare system (or non-system) according to the three levels of responsibility set out in international law: respect, protect, and fulfill. At each level of responsibility, the U.S. should approach health in terms of all of its substantive and procedural elements, keeping in mind the interdependency of those elements. Although the discussion primarily focuses on the provision of health care, it is equally important to address the underlying determinants of health-such as education, food, and housing-that are inseparable ingredients to a person's overall health. 111 Carmalt et al., supra note 60, at 3. 112 Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Health Care Terror, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2007, at A17 (referencing words by former U.S. President Ronald Reagan to the American Medical Association warning that the program now known as Medicare would lead to totalitarianism). 113 Yamin, supra note 62, at 1157-58.
II. FAILING TO RESPECT THE RIGHT TO HEALTH: DISCRIMINATION IN U.S. HEALTHCARE DELIVERY
The first level of governmental obligation regarding any human right is the obligation to respect, meaning the United States may not interfere-directly or indirectly-with the right to health. 114 The United States is obligated to respect the human right to health insofar as failing to do so may result in arbitrary deprivation of life because of its obligations under article 6 of the ICCPR. 115 The U.S. is also obligated by its ratification of the ICERD to respect the right to health specifically in terms of ensuring that it prohibits all forms of discrimination that affect access to public health and medical care. 116 The CESCR has specifically noted the relationship between the prohibition against discrimination and the obligation to respect the right to health in its General Comment 14:
Violations of the obligation to respect are those State actions, policies or laws that contravene the standards set out in article 12 of the Covenant and are likely to result in bodily harm, unnecessary morbidity and preventable mortality. Examples include the denial of access to health facilities, goods and services to particular individuals or groups as a result of de jure or de facto discrimination . . . . 117 The United States violates the obligation to respect the right to health because (a) its laws and policies do not prohibit de facto discrimination in the access to health facilities, goods and services and (b) such discrimination exists and can result in the arbitrary deprivation of life.
118
A. Failing to prohibit de facto discrimination Domestic law in the United States prohibits only intentional, 114 CESCR General Comment 14, supra note 12, para. 33. For a discussion of the three levels of obligation-respect, protect, fulfill-as they relate specifically to the right to health, see Brigit Toebes, The Right to Health, in Eide et al., supra note 13, at 169.
115 ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 6. See discussion supra Part I(B)(i). 116 ICERD, supra note 15, art. 5(e)(iv). See discussion supra Part I(B)(ii). 117 CESCR General Comment 14, supra note 12, para. 50. 118 Arguably, existing de facto discrimination could also be considered a violation of the obligation to protect, since it threatens the right to health but is not part of state activities. However, the fact that the United States does not prohibit de facto discrimination means that its laws are likely to result in violations of the right to health. See CESCR General Comment 14, supra note 12, para. 50. Therefore, the problem of de facto discrimination is analyzed here in terms of the obligation to respect rather than the obligation to protect.
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de jure discrimination. 119 The provisions under U.S. law that prohibit discrimination 120 could include de facto discrimination, but they have not been interpreted that way. Instead, since 1976 the Supreme Court has interpreted the prohibition against discrimination under U.S. law to include an intent requirement; the so-called "intent doctrine" was articulated in Washington v. Davis, which held that "a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racial discriminatory purpose, is [not] unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact." 121 The intent doctrine has been extended to apply to actions under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 122 and most recently, to actions challenging government policy. 123 Taken together, these holdings mean that the United States does not interpret the domestic prohibition against discrimination to include de facto discrimination. This interpretation directly conflicts with U.S. obligations under the ICCPR and ICERD, both of which specifically include de facto discrimination as part of the overall prohibition against discrimination.
124
Insofar as the U.S. legal stance allows de facto discrimination to continue in access to health facilities, goods and services, it also constitutes a violation of the obligation to respect the right to health.
B. Existing de facto discrimination and health disparities
In addition to failing to prohibit de facto discrimination, the United States also has significant de facto discrimination in terms of access to health care and to the underlying determinants of health. Americans, 125 infant mortality rates for African Americans are more than double that for whites, 126 and significant disparities exist in a wide variety of other health indicators, including cardiac disease and HIV/AIDS.
127 Disparate health impacts are not limited to African Americans; American Indians and Pacific Islanders also have consistently poorer health than whites, as do other subpopulations such as those of differing nationality or immigration status. 128 Racial disparities in health indicators are particularly dramatic when they are compounded by gender. For example, maternal mortality rates for African American women are nearly four times what they are for white women. 129 These disparities are no accident; they are rooted in structural inequities that have existed in this country since its inception. 130 Although they have many direct and indirect causes, disparate health outcomes continue to exist (and in some cases, worsen) because there is unequal access to both health care and to the underlying determinants of health. 131 Underlying determinants of health include a wide variety of factors, but some of the most important are the conditions of housing and education and the physical and social environments in which people live. 132 The United States has high levels of racial residential segregation, with racial groups living in different, isolated geographic areas. 133 Where people live is a fundamental causal factor in terms of health outcomes, especially when it is combined with poverty. 134 Americans are more likely than poor whites to live in areas of concentrated poverty. 135 These areas receive fewer public investments, which leads to deteriorating infrastructure, housing, education, and a lower overall standard of living that is directly related to a variety of lower health outcomes. 136 In addition, racial residential segregation results in problems of health care availability: approximately 50 million people-a disproportionate percentage of whom are minorities-live in areas that are underserved by physicians. 137 The racial divide in access to the underlying determinants of health is exacerbated by the lack of available, accessible, acceptable, and quality health care for minorities in the United States. The high cost of health goods and services means that people without health insurance are less likely to have economic access to services. In the United States, there are significant racial disparities in terms of who does or does not have insurance. For example, the 2006 National Healthcare Disparities Report ("NHDR") found that decreased access to health care for Hispanics is directly related to the fact that "Hispanics of every income and education level were significantly less likely than respective non-Hispanic Whites to have health insurance." 138 However, economic barriers to accessing health care in the U.S. are more complex than who does or does not have insurance. Although the vast majority of uninsured people do not have access to health care, it does not follow that the people with insurance do have access to care. In other words, just because people have health insurance does not mean they can afford health care. Indeed, African Americans in the United States have about the same access as whites to health insurance, but they still face worsening economic access to care. 139 This finding reflects the problem of underinsurance in the United States, which occurs when individuals hold health insurance policies that provide inadequate coverage. Problems of availability and accessibility are compounded for minorities by issues of quality and acceptability. In the United States, racial disparities exist across multiple dimensions of quality of health care. 141 For example, the NHDR found that during the years studied, there were significantly higher rates of postoperative complications for blacks than for whites 142 and significantly higher rates of death following complications in care for Asians or Pacific Islanders than for whites. 143 The acceptability of care-for example, in terms of patient-provider communications and the timeliness in responding to patient needs-also reflects significant and worsening differences between minorities and whites. 144 In addition to conclusions made by the latest NHDR, the Institute of Medicine's extensive review of inequality in health care found that minorities experience a wide range of barriers to quality care, including "barriers of language, geography, and cultural familiarity." 145 The lack of available, accessible, acceptable, quality health care for minorities is compounded by the lack of access to the underlying determinants of health. It therefore violates the human right to health as it is defined under international law. In addition, it violates the U.S. obligation to respect the right to life under article 6 of the ICCPR.
146 Since the U.S. does not recognize de facto discrimination as a prohibited form of discrimination (in violation of its obligations under the ICERD), these disparities do not trigger a domestic legal response. Instead, the bifurcated system has continued to produce health inequity, violating the obligation to respect the human right to health, and violating U.S. obligations under the ICCPR and ICERD. right to health. 147 The United States has an obligation to protect the right to health as part of its obligation to prevent the arbitrary deprivation of life under article 6 of the ICCPR. 148 To the extent that failing to protect against these actions may allow structural flaws to deepen, the U.S. also violates the obligations associated with its signing of the ICESCR. 149 Third parties may include other states, individual actors, or privately held entities, such as for-profit companies or transnational corporations. 150 The nature of prohibited third-party interference is varied and may include individual or systemic threats. For example, under the Sixth Amendment, criminal defendants have a right to a speedy and public trial. 151 An individual threat to a defendant's trial may occur if a person disrupts the court's proceedings. The state protects against that threat in the form of a judge who maintains order in the courtroom. However, the duty to protect may also be triggered by structural flaws that result in systemic violations. A systemic threat to the indigent criminal defendant's rights, for example, would arise if the only available defense attorneys were those that required payment for their services. The state protects against this systemic threat to the right to a fair trial by providing public defenders that represent indigent criminal defendants at no cost.
152
Like the right to a fair trial, the right to health also requires protection against both individual and systemic threats. To that end, the CESCR states that the right to health includes a duty "to ensure that privatization of the health sector does not constitute a threat to the availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality of health facilities, goods and services." 153 Privatizing the healthcare sector is not in and of itself a human rights issue; from a rightsbased perspective, what matters is not how a system is financed but whether the system promotes the highest attainable standard of mental and physical health. 154 However, if a state chooses to privatize its healthcare sector, it must ensure that its reliance on the private sector does not threaten the right to health. 155 Like most countries, the United States uses a mixture of private and public insurers to provide access to health goods and services. However, unlike other countries, the U.S. relies primarily on for-profit entities to provide access to health services and goods. In 2006, approximately two-thirds of the non-elderly American population (about 158 million people) had private health insurance, while the remaining third held publicly provided insurance or were uninsured. 156 Most of those with private health insurancesixty-one percent 157 -are covered by their employers or as an employee-dependant. 158 Public insurance is available for the very poor and for the elderly through Medicaid and Medicare, respectively. 159 It is also available for children in families within a certain percentage of the poverty line through the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). 160 These programs provide an important safety net, but their exclusivity contravenes the fundamental principle of a human right to health, which calls for universal access to health facilities, goods, and services. 161 Moreover, the high costs of medical treatment in the United States coupled with low-income eligibility requirements means that many millions of people who cannot afford private insurance remain ineligible for
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[Vol. 11:359 the public safety net. 162 The dominance of the private sector in the United States violates the right to health for two reasons: (1) because insurance companies consistently deny coverage to unhealthy or poor individuals, which results in problems of availability and accessibility, and (2) because companies consistently deny benefits to insured individuals, which results in problems of accessibility and quality. In both cases, the violations arise not because of reliance on private companies per se, but rather because of the failure to ensure that the organizations providing access to health care have the ultimate goal of promoting health for the population as a whole.
A. Denial of coverage to the poor and unhealthy
Nearly seventy percent of the people without health insurance coverage are unable to afford it or were denied coverage due to poor health, illness, or age. 163 This means that the poorest and sickest Americans are unable to obtain private health insurance. Although some of those without insurance are eligible for public insurance, millions are not: in 2005, three-quarters of the 44.6 million people without insurance were ineligible for Medicaid on the basis of income. 164 Being ineligible for Medicaid does not mean that they can afford health insurance: of the approximately 33.5 million uninsured people ineligible for Medicaid, only about 8 million had annual incomes more than 300% of the federal poverty line. 165 The incentives of the U.S. market-based healthcare system lead to denial of coverage to the poor and to the unhealthy. 166 More than any others, these two groups lack access to health care due almost entirely to an unregulated market-based system. Peo- 162 163 Among those who say they are uninsured, 54% said they did not have insurance because it is too expensive. An additional 15% said they did not have insurance because they could not get coverage/were refused coverage due to poor health, illness, or age. ABC/KFF/USA Survey, supra note 6, at chart 11.
164 HOLAHAN ET AL., supra note 162, at 1. 165 See id. 166 The very poorest Americans can obtain public insurance in the form of Medicaid. However, most of those who are currently uninsured are not poor enough to qualify for Medicaid but still cannot afford private insurance. Instead of providing a financial incentive to promote health, private health insurance companies have an incentive to deny access to health care, goods, and services. In particular, there is a financial incentive to provide coverage to the healthy and wealthy and to deny it to individuals who are unhealthy and/or poor (two qualities that frequently go together, since poverty typically results in restricted access to the underlying determinants of health). 168 The incentive to deny coverage to people who are poor arises from the inability of poor people to pay insurance premiums. Most people in the U.S. who have private health insurance are covered by their employers or as an employee dependent. 169 However, the vast majority (over eight in ten) of the people who are uninsured come from working families. 170 In other words, even with Medicaid in place to cover the very poorest portion of the population, working families cannot afford to purchase health insurance. From the insurance company's perspective, there is no incentive to provide insurance to people who cannot afford it, since those people will be unable to pay the premiums. Since the insurance company's goal is to maintain profitability rather than to increase accessibility to health care, there is no incentive to extend coverage to those who cannot afford to purchase a policy.
Market-based incentives similarly work against the interests of those who are unhealthy. The nature of health expenses is such that most of the population will require few payments most of the time. For example, in 2003, "health spending roughly followed the '80-20 rule': 20 percent of the population accounted for 80 percent of expenses."
171 From an insurance company's perspective, therefore, there is a financial incentive to cover the eighty percent of people who will not need services (except those who cannot pay for the policy) and there is an incentive not to insure the twenty percent who do need services (i.e. the sick, who are, typically, also poor). Thus, those who are in the greatest need of healthcare cov- 167 See CERD Shadow Report, supra note 127, at 16. 168 The high cost of medical goods and services in the United States means that having health insurance directly corresponds to economic access for most health facilities, goods, and services. 173 People without health insurance are significantly more likely to go without needed medical care, and are less likely to receive preventive care when healthy or regular care for chronic conditions. 174 According to the Institute of Medicine, the lack of health insurance causes approximately 18,000 deaths in the United States each year. 175 For many people without insurance (one in six), emergency rooms are the regular source of care because those departments are the only ones required to treat all patients, regardless of ability to pay. 176 Given the high costs of emergency care and the forty-seven million people without insurance, 177 this reliance on emergency departments drives costs up across the board, negatively affecting access to medical goods and services for both the uninsured and the insured.
B. Denial of benefits
In addition to the incentives to deny coverage, there is a financial incentive for companies to deny coverage for health benefits for people who already hold policies. Indeed, patients with poor physical functioning are more likely to report denial of coverage from obligated to protect that right by its ratification of the ICCPR.
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Even where individual violations of the right to health fall short of threatening life, however, it is in the best interests of the United States to address the structural reasons behind systemic violations. To do otherwise risks continuing the status quo, which sees increasing numbers of Americans unable to access quality health care, goods, and services.
IV. FAILING TO FULFILL THE RIGHT TO HEALTH: REFORM MEASURES THAT MAKE THINGS WORSE
The obligations to respect and protect are complimented by a third level of governmental responsibility under human rights law: the obligation to fulfill. The United States has an obligation to fulfill the right to health because doing so contributes to the prevention of arbitrary deprivation of life, in accordance with its obligations under the ICCPR. 187 Moreover, because the U.S. signed the ICESCR, it is prohibited from taking actions that would defeat the object and purpose of that treaty, such as introducing structural changes that make it unlikely or impossible for the state to meet its article 12 obligations in the future. 188 Therefore, the United States should take a rights-based approach to healthcare reform and regulation so that it does not deepen structural flaws that jeopardize future adherence to the right to health.
According to the CESCR, the obligation to fulfill the right to health "requires States to adopt appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional and other measures towards the full realization of the right to health." 189 Those measures should be designed to implement the right to health, and they should not only include the provision of health care, but should also include "equal access for all to the underlying determinants of health, such as nutritiously safe food and potable drinking water, basic sanitation and adequate housing and living conditions."
190
Violations of the obligation to fulfill the right to health include, inter alia, the failure to "adopt or implement a national health policy designed to ensure the right to health for everyone." 191 Although the U.S. relies extensively on the private sector to 186 ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 6(1). See supra Part I(B)(i). 187 Id. ganized. Compounding the lack of economic access are the lack of available services for minorities and rural populations, disproportionately low minority representation in the health workforce that results in culturally unacceptable care, and uneven quality of care across the population.
202
International human rights law begins with the premise that healthcare systems should be structured to promote the highest attainable standard of health for everyone. This presents a different approach to thinking about the U.S. approach to health care: instead of asking how low-income families can best afford health insurance, human rights law asks how insurance can best provide health coverage to low-income families. By reversing the question, a rights-based approach avoids common assumptions like the idea that providing insurance results in access to health goods and services. It also reshapes deeply politicized discussions about the role of government in providing health care. 203 Under a human rights approach, the role of the government is to protect and ensure the availability, accessibility, acceptability, and quality of health facilities, goods, and services. Whether government provides health services directly, relies on the market for such services, or uses a combination of both is only relevant insofar as it affects the ability of people to have the highest attainable standard of health.
Although the United States is not a party to the ICESCR, it is nonetheless legally required to uphold the right to health insofar as that right is part of its ICCPR article 6 obligations. In addition, as a party to the ICERD, the U.S. is legally required by international law to recognize and address the existing de facto segregation of its healthcare system. Finally, the fact the U.S. has signed the ICESCR means that it is legally required to refrain from defeating that treaty's object and purpose. Taken together, these obligations mean that the United States has some legal duty to respect, protect, and fulfill the right to health. However, even beyond any legal obligation, it is in the country's best interest to reform health care from a rights-based perspective. To do otherwise risks continuing the downward spiral of inequitable coverage and prohibitive costs by reinforcing existing structural flaws. The United States should use the human right to health to rethink its approach to health care and to reform its system to promote the highest attainable standard of health for everyone.
